100%
. My concern, then, over trivial interval estimates reflects the tension between the confidence level (less than 100%) and a known probability (of exactly 100%).
Neyman's theory of confidence interval estimation was designed, as he reports, to avoid the variety of perceived deficiencies in solutions to problems of estimation advanced by others. [Neyman 1937, 911 In particular, with regard to the Bayesian strategy for solving interval estimation problems by Bayes' theorem, i.e., for calculating probabilities of hypotheses about the unknown parameters h, given statistical data d, using the theorem: P(h/d) cc P(d/h) . P(h), Neyman's objections focus on the "prior" probability component "P(h)." He summarizes his dissatisfaction with this approach as follows:
It is known that, as far as we work with the conception of probability as adopted in this paper, the above [Bayesian] theoretically perfect solution may be applied in practice only in quite exceptional cases, and this for two reasons:
(a) It is only very rarely that the parameters . . . are random variables. They are generally unknown constants and therefore their probability law a priori has no meaning.
(b) Even if the parameters to be estimated . . . could be considered as random variables, the elementary probability law a priori . . . is usually unknown, and hence the formula [Bayes' Theorem] cannot be used because of the lack of the necessary data. (Neyman 1937, p. 258) Unfortunately, the two reasons quickly collapse into one, as Neyman notes that even "constants" have degenerate prior probability distributions concentrated on the two extreme probability values 0 and 1.
It is true that any constant, 6 , might be formally considered as a random variable with the integral probability law P{a 5 6 < b) having only values unity or zero according to whether 5 falls between a and b or not. (Neyman 1937, p. 257) Thus, I have interpreted Neyman's objection to the Bayesian solution to be based on the accurate observation that typically the investigator is ignorant of any precise, frequency based (chance based) prior probability for the unknown quantities (parameters). (Seidenfeld, That is, I understand Neyman to reject the Bayesian solution since, in most cases, the investigator has merely indeterminate knowledge of "prior" chances for the unknown quantities.' However, this criticism of Bayesian inference does not excuse Neyman from paying attention to consequences of the "theoretically perfect solution," where those consequences are independent of any specific "prior". That is, the tension between confidence intervals which cover the full parameter space at less than 100% confidence and the known probability 1 for such interval estimates reflects a conflict between Neyman's recommended solution and a consequence of the Bayesian solution that is independent of the controversial "prior" probability.
In my book, I conclude the discussion of the statistical example (where the N-P "best" intervals are recognizably trivial) by pointing out there exists an alternative system of confidence sets, denoted [CI,,,,] , also with exact confidence levels, which dominates the "best" intervals for the undesirable property of covering the full parameter space at less than 100% confidence. However, the alternative system [CI,,,,] is generated from a severely biased N-P family of tests, tests of lowest N-P standard^.^ That is, I present a reductio argument against the thesis that [CI,] is the best system of estimates (which it is by Neyman's standards), since one may improve on the N-P "best" intervals for the purpose of minimizing the set of observations leading to trivial intervals. In other words, by shifting from the N-P "best" estimates to one deemed "worse than useless", we can reduce the instances of conflict between a known probability and the confidence coefficient.
In "In Defense of the Neyman-Pearson Theory of Confidence Intervals", D. Mayo expresses several points of dissent with the analysis I have provided on this matter. Most general, and to my mind most central, is her claim that my concern with interval estimates that cover the full parameter space at less than 100% confidence, "trivial" intervals, reflects an illegitimate interpretation of confidence intervals based on an inappropriate concern for "measures of final precision". For example, she says, It must be stressed, however, that having seen the value x, NP theory never permits one to conclude that the specific confidence interval formed covers the true value of 0 with either (1 -a) 100% probability or (1 -a) 100% degree of confidence. (Mayo 1981, p. 272) But, as I have argued (above), even on Neyman's conception of probability there is an acceptable probability for the trivial intervals. They carry a known probability 1. Thus, I dispute Mayo's assertion that, in focusing 'Confidence intervals at the (1 -a) level can be generated from families of hypothesis tests with size a.The estimate is formed, for particular data, as the union of (null) values, corresponding to null hypotheses, left unrejected by those observations. The reader should note that, in generating estimates from families of hypothesis tests, tests biased to one side of the null hypothesis yield estimates biased on the other side of the true parameter value.
on the triviality of certain N-P estimates, I rely on an illegitimate interpretation of Neyman's theory. In fact, I chose to attend to those cases exactly because they admit known probabilities (in conflict with their confidence level), where the probabilities satisfy Neyman's constraints and avoid his objections to "priors".
Mayo adds to this general criticism a number of objections to my analysis of the specific statistical example I construct. In particular, she alleges that: (A) I misidentify [CIA] as the N-P "best" system of interval estimates; (B) a different system, her [CI,] , is the N-P "best" one for the problem; and (C) since [CI,] never provides trivial intervals, I have no ground on which to object to N-P theory. I reject each of these claims, and in what follows I offer reasons for my judgment that Mayo has failed to respond to my argument against confidence interval theory. Let me begin with a brief rehearsal of the example.
The statistical problem I develop is a variant of one presented by Neyman in his classic paper (Neyman 1937) 
ON AFTER-TRIAL PROPERTIES
In section 3 of her paper, Mayo finds that the [CI,] system is not "best" when the parameter space contains the upper bound. She says, In the case were 0 is truncated from above, however, it seems that a one-sided test would generate a more appropriate confidence interval; namely, one which is one-sided. (Mayo, p. 274) and, I suggest that in the situation where 0 is truncated from above, a onesided (lower) confidence interval is called for. (Mayo, p. 274) It is on the basis of this suggestion that Mayo forwards her [CI,] system as the "best" N-P candidate solution.
Though yielding a "one-sided" estimate (an upper bound) for 0, the [CI,] system is based on a "two-sided" test in the sense that one attempts to minimize the probability of including false values of the parameter in the estimate, be those values above or below the true parameter value. That is, one pays equal attention to errors in estimation that arise from extending the estimate unnecessarily far above or below the true value. In a "one-sided" test, and derivative interval estimates, one discounts errors in one direction, i.e., the demands of the problem are such that one may ignore errors to one side of the true value. As Neyman points out (Neyman 1937, pp. 284-86) and as Mayo reminds us (Mayo, p. 275) such might be the constraints in an inquiry as to the minimum gain in yield of a new grain over the established one, or an inquiry as to the upper limit of the percentage of defective items in a manufactured batch. But I fail to understand why Mayo thinks that, with the introduction of truncation of the parameter space, the demands for information must change so that we no longer care about errors on one side of the true value. Specifically, Mayo's suggestion is that, with the truncation from above, 0 5 0, we ought to discount errors in estimation due to including unnecessarily many false values 0' greater than the true value of 0.
In the example under discussion, the upshot of this recommendation is quite serious from the standpoint of the "biased" status of the intervals Mayo's [CI,] system produces. Just as in the alternative [CI,, ] system I construct for the reductio argument (see figure 3) , the [CI,] estimates are severely biased for alternatives above the true value of 0 (see figure 2, p. 289). Equivalently, both underlying families of hypothesis tests are biased with respect to alternatives below the null value, i.e., with respect to alternatives below h,: 0 = 0, the probability of rejecting h, is greater when true than when false! Thus, if we maintain the same demands for information in the case of truncation as is assumed in the original version (Neyman's formulation with no upper bound on 0), the [CI,] system is ranked well below the [CI,] system according to the standards proposed 286 TEDDY SEIDENFELD by Neyman. Of course, I would insist that there is no regulation dictating that we must shift our concerns from "two-sided" to "one-sided" estimation when parameter spaces are truncated. Thus, I do not accept Mayo's suggestion that, when an upper bound 8 is fixed, [CI,] is "better"
In passing, I note that for many common statistical problems, e.g., estimation of a binomial parameter or estimation of the mean of a normal distribution, there is incentive to use one-sided procedures if the context allows. In such circumstances there are no UMP-tests against the twosided alternative hypothesis, whereas there are UMP-tests for the onesided alternatives. However, for the problem discussed here, there is a UMP-test for the two-sided alternative hypotheses. Thus, there can be no advantage gained, in terms of increasing the power of tests or decreasing the probability of covering false parameter values in estimates, by shifting from two-sided to one-sided procedures. For the example discussed, there is no improvement afforded by changing standards and discounting errors in estimation due to interval estimates that extend too far above the true value. ' Also, I wish to point out that Mayo's [CI,] fails to be a confidence system, subject to Neyman's requirement that each possible observation m e point is easily pressed. Invariably the investigator knows enough to adopt bounds for parameters, i.e., invariably the parameter spaces can be truncated on theoretical grounds (at least). Does such background information dictate that one-sided procedures are more appropriate than two-sided ones? I see no reason to believe so.
Also, just when one should agree truncation has taken place is open to dispute. Even in the original version of the statistical problem (0 unbounded above), one might argue that 0 (the lower bound for 0) represents truncation-the statistical model can be extended so that, for negative 0, X is uniformly distributed between 0 and 0. (The distribution of X for 0 = 0 is arbitrary, say then X is a point-mass with probability concentrated at the point x = 0.) In short, on both practical and theoretical grounds, I find unwarranted Mayo's proposal to modify the concern with errors, i.e., to shift from two-sided to one-sided procedures, in the presence of a truncation in the parameter space. I see no reason to adopt the proposal as a general methodological rule. 'Let p < 1, so that PO, < 0, = 0 (by assumption). Fix the confidence level at (1 -a).
Then the probability, given 0 = O, , of including (covering) the false value j30, with the [CI,] system of estimation is just the probability of an observation x 5 (1 -a)pO,, which is the value (1 -a ) P Similarly, with [CI,] , the probability of covering the false value j30, is just the probability of an observation x satisfying the inequalities: ape, 5 x 5 PO,, which also is the value (1 -a ) P Thus, with respect to false parameter values below the true one, the [CI,] system is no more accurate than [CI,], whereas [CI,] is much more accurate with respect to alternative (false) values above the true one.
Moreover, because all (consistent) hypothesis tests are, for this problem, equally unbiased with respect to alternatives above the null value, all (consistent) systems of estimation are equally accurate with respect to false values below the true one. Hence, for this problem, shifting concern to one-sided procedures by dismissing errors in estimation for false values above the true one, leads to a situation in which all systems of estimation are judged equally accurate! 287 ON AFTER-TRIAL PROPERTIES generate some e~t i m a t e .~ As can be seen from figure 2, the [CI,] system provides no estimate of 0 whenever x > X* .' I note that the [CI,,,,] system satisfies Neyman's condition (that there always be an estimate) by including an (arbitrarily) narrow "strip of acceptance" along the line (x = 0), see figure 3 . In fact, my [CI,,,] offer a rebuttal to the objection discussed here, the objection that estimates labeled "best" by N-P standards may be deficient with respect to the legitimate concern to avoid conflicts between confidence levels and known (precise) probabilities. I base the rebuttal on a novel criterion: confidence equivalence. Perhaps others will find that defense adequate to excuse the triviality of (some) N-P "best" procedures. I do not. Nor do I find Mayo's proposals sufficient for the question at hand.
'This is Neyman's condition (ii) (Neyman 1937, p. 267) . He uses it to eliminate a candidate estimation system, his #(I), pp. 269-70.
9I have recently discovered that R. von Mises observed this same difficulty in the onesided system [CI,] and, to some extent, anticipated the discussion of trivial confidence intervals (von Mises 1941, pp. 202-03) .
Mayo responds to this technical objection in her fourth footnote (Mayo, pp. 2 7 3 , where she says, Hence whenever x > (1 -a)c, [CI,] collapses to the limiting case of the interval;
This claim is false for the [Ch] estimation system defined by Mayo (Mayo, . In order to modify the [CI,] system so that it has this new feature, while retaining its status as a one-sided estimate, one must sacrifice the exact confidence level (1 -a), and report (merely) that estimates from the modified [CI,] system cany a confidence level of at least 1 -a. Of course, intervals that cover all parameter values are not in conflict with known probabilities if they cany the "conservative" (at least) 1 -a confidence level. Thus, if the only solution to the problem I raise is to revert to "conservative" estimates, then my objection stands since it would be admitted that the "best" N-P confidence intervals with exact confidence levels are deficient.
"Mayo states, in connection with her objection to the property (Seidenfeld, p. 57 ) that sometimes the [CI,,] estimates are not intervals, i.e., they might be two (disconnected) intervals, . . . it is counterintuitive to accept values of 0, both above and below a value of 0 which is rejected. (Mayo, (This property of [CI,,] is equivalent to the existence of, what Mayo calls, a "bite" taken out of the rejection region.) However, I remind the reader that, both in practice and in theory, N-P procedures can recommend estimates with this property. A case in point (discussed in my book) is Fieller's solution to the problem of estimation of the ratio of means for two (independent) normally distributed random variables-a problem with considerable practical significance. Thus, I do not find the "bite" disturbing. The alternative [CI,,,,] confidence intervals ( a 5 .9), used for the "reductio" argument. The reader will note that the sole difference between the [CI,] and [CI,,] systems is that the latter contain an (arbitrarily) narrow "strip of acceptance" along the diagonal line "x = 0." This allows the [CI,,,,] provides trivial intervals only for x 2 X" = (1 -[.1 a])0.As required for the "reductio" argument, these interval estimates are severely biased for false values above the true one.
